Managers, workers, and policymakers who support worker participation have their separate reasons for doing so. Management is primarily seeking increased productivity.
Workers are seeking a voice in affairs that affect their working conditions and their income either in situations where unions do not exist or where issues not commonly of great interest to union leaders need more attention. Worker participation is important in these situations not only for what it achieves in terms of specific changes but also for the payoff in self-esteem or self-fulfillment that is the product of the process itself.
Policymakers and academic analysts see worker participation as a way of strengthening fundamental economic units and processes in society and of fostering industrial peace and stability.
The similarity of the goals of these groups is readily apparent. Even if the emphases are not identical, the objectives are certainly not contradictory. And this perhaps explains much of the appeal of the participation movement: It looks like a no-lose, everybody-wins situation. Or at least it offers the potential for everybody benefits kind of game-good for management, for workers, for policy makers, and for the public at large.
The effects of participation on distribution of power, industrial peace, alienation, and efficiency are difficult to determine because they are not readily separable from other effects on the operation of the firm and the morale of the workers. Moreover, generalization is risky because of differences in the forms of participation, work setting, and expectations of the participants. With these caveats in mind, managers may find guidance in the following conclusions:
• Participation of workers in managerial functions does not necessarily lessen managerial prerogatives; sometimes worker cooperation may heighten managerial leverage.
• The effective power of both management and workers may be enhanced if by their cooperative approach they are able to handle problems that had been uncontrolled or poorly handled in the past-for instance, safety problems.
• The effect of participation on distribution of power depends on the strength of other structures within a firm. For example, if trade unions are effective in the handling of grievances, other types of participation may have little effect on the balance of power.
• Industrial peace is not necessarily furthered by participation. The results of participatory efforts in various countries are mixed, despite the avowed purpose of improving cooperation and of reducing strife that is always a goal of worker participation. Some relation has been observed between workers' favorable attitudes toward trade unionism and favorable attitudes toward co-operation, presumably within the union-management relations framework.
• The effects of participation on workers' attitudes tend to reflect the relative success or failure of that participation once the initial enthusiasm has worn of}. Frustrations as well as achievements are reported by workers serving on participatory bodies. However, where workers have been given an opportunity to participate in the redesign of their job or in the plans of their working group, a very strong sense of worker involvement and satisfaction has generally been reported.
• There is little evidence to support the fear that participation hampers efficiency, except where the amount of participation varies greatly from what had been expected by either labor or management or both. Some evidences of improved efficiency are reported as a result of a participatory style of super vision (apart from formal participatory bodies). However, it has not been easy to separate the effects of the participatory process itself from the effects of the improved organization of the work group that may be achieved through participation.
Generally, these conclusions suggest that there appears to be more evidence regarding the impact of worker participation on productivity and managerial concerns than on the quality of work life. In addition, what is missing from the study is a notion of costs-not only the direct costs of worker time devoted to consultation but also the costs of some other worker objectives foregone. This is equally true of the experiments on job restructuring.